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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BOWEN,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 15,137

RUTH OLSEN,
DefendantRespondent.
BRIEF CF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee suggests that the Court will better understand
the facts if Exhibit 2 is kept in front of the reader for
ready reference.
In the fall of 1975, Mrs.
~ately

Ols~n

was the owner of approxi-

five acres of land located at 1400 North and 200 West

in Provo.

(Exhibit 1).

The property has about 400 feet of

frontage on 200 West and the north and south lines are
approximately parallel in an east west direction.

The

eastern boundary was on an angle generally north-northeast
as the navigator might call it.

Within a distance of 50 to

100 feet from the east boundary the property is bisected by
a canal coDrnonly called the Hill Race which runs generally
north and south approxiraately parallel to the east boundary.
llrs. Olsen was formerly Hrs. Frazier and Exhibit 1,
Prepared by the engineer and surveyor erroneously labels the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pro[_)erty as Frazier property.

His second diagram, Exhihit

corn:!cts his error and [_)roperly designates it as the 0ls":
property.
In the fall of 1975 !'!rs. Olsen began to receive a
number of proposals relating to the property.

In order tn

explain those proposals and better understand the facts.
they are considered chronologically.
1.

Summer of 1975.

It was contel'.lplated by Mrs. Ols 2.

that the city would construct a road running east and west
along the south side of the property.

This

~treet

was

necessary because of the large apartment house complex t<i&t
was then under construction on North lJniveu;i ty iwenue eas:
of the Olsen property.

This street requirement was

furthe~'

dictated by the fact that there were no other east and w2st
streets between 1230 North and 1550 North.
2.

September 3, 1975.

to Purchase - Walters.

Earnest Money Peceipt and Offc.

(Exhibit 3).

On this date a Mr.

Warren C. Walters made a proposal to Mrs. Olsen to purchasi
the property shown as parcel A on Exhibit 2.

The

proper~

which Mr. Walters then desired to purchase was 163.03 foo'.
of frontage on 200 West which commenced 33 feet north ot
Mrs. Olsen's south boundary.

The reason for the 33 foot

reservation is that it was then contemplated that Mrs. Ole
would contribute the 33 feet for a proposed roadway to Pr:
City.

'l'ha t of fer 11as never
3.

Decel'.lber 19, 1975.

to Purchase - Vialters.

acce~Jted.

Earnest noney Receipt and o:'

(Exhibit 4).

At this time t!r. i!al
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3

g3in negotiated a purchase of substantially the same pro-

perty described in his previous earnest money, except that
this time he was to acquire the 33 feet and to make the
dedication of the roadway to Provo City himself.
was accepted.

This offer

The offer by its terms required closing on or

b2fore December 31, 1975.

4.

December 22, 1975.

to Purchase - Bowen.

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

(Exhibits 5 and 6).

The property sub-

ject to this offer lies immediately to the east of the
property subject to the Walters offer of December 19, 1975.
Exhibit 5 is the Earnest Noney Receipt and Offer to
Purchase as signed by llr. Bowen.

At that time,

Dece~ber

22, 1975, the option language on lines 47 to 55 was not
included.

The option was added on January 8, 1976, by Mr.

Ronald G. Gardner, acting on behalf of Mr. David Bowen, and
outside of the presence of Mr. Bowen.

(See Exhibit 6).

Mr. Gardner, on behalf of Mr. David Bowen, prepared this
instrument on December 22, 1975, however, it was not presented to rlrs. Olsen until January 8, 1976.
Gardner, who had been Bowen's agent in the previous
transaction, arranged to meet with Mrs. Olsen in his office
on the 8th of January, 1976, after tlrs. Olsen's work day.
llrs. Olsen was employed at Z.C.N.I., and when she completed
her duties that day she proceeded to Mr. Gardner's office.
At that time he added the "option'' language included on
lines 47 throusn 55 of Exhibit 6 which is as follows:

-3-
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Seller also agrees to give buyer an option on
part or all property west of piece being purchased.
Buyer understands there presently
exists an Earnest Money Offer in favor of Iron
Horse Corporation.
This is preserved as a bac%up to that offer.
This option good for ninety
days from time of original offer being released
and notice given to buyer.
Option to be sarne
price and terms of contract effected between
Iron Horse Corporation and Ruth Olsen.
(D.
Ex. 6).
All of the writing and all of the language contained o·
Exhibit 6 were selected by Mr. Gardner.

At that time, whiJ,

Mrs. Olsen was present, he called Mr. Lee Bamgartner, Mrs,
Olsen's real estate agent, and explained the nature of the
suggested option.
December 22, 1975.

Virs. Olsen then signed the document of
She did not know who "Jr\Jn Horse'' Cor-

poration was, but she assur.ied that the language was meaninc·'
ful to Gardner and Bowen.

(R. 104, 106).

As of January 8, 1976, Mrs. Olsen had never met Mr.
Bowen, and all dealings related to the Bowen offer were
conducted by Mr. Gardner.
5.

( R. 101).

Early February, 1976.

Mr. David E. Castle

contac~'.

Mrs. Olsen and explained his interest in purchasing her
property that had heretofore been the subject of Walter's
offer of December 19, 1973.

Walters, by this time, appearc

to have forfeited his interest in the property.

Mrs. Olser

told Hr. Castle that she could not deal with him becauses~
had some sort of an option agreement with Bowen.

(R. 110).

llrs. Olsen told Castle that he would have to resolve the
matter with Bowen before she could deal directly with hii"·
( R. llO).
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

Ther-eafter, Mrs. Olsen, i1r. Bamgartner and 11r. Castle
all talked with Mr. Gardner, who appeared to be Mr. Bowen's
agent.

Hr. Gardner advised all three of these people that

"Bowen does not want the property".

Mrs. Olsen remembered

the conversation clearly because she had to go to Georgia on
Febr-uary 16, so she knew the conversation with Mr. Gardner
took place prior to that date.

She located the discussion

as having occurred in the Z.C.M.I. store when she saw Mr.
Gardner.

He advised her that "Bowen does not want the

property".

6.

(R. 108, 109).

February 17, 1976.

to Purchase - Castle.

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

(Exhibit 7).

Mr. Castle testified

that he had been dealing with Walters in January and February of 1976 and had discovered that Walters did not want
the property and could not c?mplete the contract by himself.
Walters was, however, interested in a portion of the property.
After learning of the Walters interest in the property,
he then contacted Gardner to find out if Bowen had continuing interest in an option on the Walters property.

He

believes that he talked to Gardner on February 17, because
he has a memo dated that date with information that he could
only have acquired from Gardner.

(R. 194).

He at that time

told Gardner that he had been approached by Walters and had
agreed that they would allow him to negotiate with Mrs.
Olsen for the property that
to buy.
~ive

~alters

had theretofore offered

Gardner and Castle discussed some arrangement to

Bowen some additional parking on the property that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Castle would be buying from Mrs. Olsen if he were succes,:f
in presenting his Earnest !loney Receipt dnd Offer to Purer
On the basis of 11r. Castle's discussion with i'lr.

Gar~

and Mr. Walters, he prepared the Earnest 1ioney Agreer.ient
dated February 17, 1976, which is Exhibi l

7.

He would n0 ,

have prepared that had he felt that there was an outstandi:
option for the same property on behalf of 11r. Bowen.

In:::

Castle's words, "I had to clear with Ron Gardner in order
purchase the property."

(R. 193).

t

The Earnest MoneyAgrP:·

ment of Hr. Castle was not accepted hy Mr,_:, O.ls2n and th"
proposal failed.
7.

rlurch 11, 1976.

Purchase - Bowen.

E:;rncst t\oney R, .·r'i;>t 0nd Offer

(Exhibit 8).

At this time, Bowen, still

acting through Gardner, had concluded he needed an additio .
piece of property to the north of that which we had agreeJ
to purchase.

This was made necessary in order to acquire:

building permit.
~1r.

Gardner represented 11r. Bowen in this entire trar. 0·

action and Mrs. Olsen never, at any time, met rlr. Bowen.
By this time, Gardner had visited with Mr. Castle at
Castle's

ho~e

in Lindon and they had discussed the Bowen

property and Castle's negotiation with Mrs. Olsen for thE
property that had formerly been the subject of the Walters
transaction.

Gardner was advised concerning Castle's pl)r:

and Gardner never, at any time, told Castle that Bowen r. 3 ::
an option on the property or that he had any interest in·
Olsen (\valtcrs) property, and in fact, Garoner indicate•'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that Bowen had no further interest in the option.
As of March 4, 1976, Gardner was negotiating with
castle for additional parking for Mr. Bowen in the event
castle was able to complete his transaction with Mrs. Olsen.
(k. 173).

Castle testified that when he met with Garnder in

his home on March 4, 1976, he connected his conversation
with Gardner with the previous instructions that he had
received with Mrs. Olsen early in February to the effect
that he had to get Mr. Gardner's clearance.

He was asked

specifically the following questions:

Q.
When you met with Mr. Gardner in your
home, did you connect that meeting with
Mr. Gardner with a comment of Mrs. Frazier
made earlier in February that you had to
get his clearance?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. And did you assume by the fact that you
had told him that you were buying the property and he registered no dissent that it
was a agreeable?
A.

Yes, I did.

( R.

206)

* * *
Q. Mr. Castle, in respect to your negotiations with Mr. Gardner, did you associate
Mr. Gardner as being the agent for the bike
shop? [Mr. Bowen]
A.

Yes, I did.

( R.

207-208)

Mr. Castle never met Mr. Bowen personally, but had all
of his dealings concerning the Bowen property with Gardner.
As of !larch 4, 1976, Mrs. Olsen had never had any
dealings with Mr. Bowen, except through rlr. Gardner.
'i'he Earnest 1loney Agreement of March 11, 1976, was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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handled entirely by Mr. Gardner and Mrs.

Olsen did not

l1r. Bowen.
8.

April 7, 1976.

Purchase -

Castle.

Earnest noney Receipt ar.cl Otfc:r
On April 7, 1976, Mr.

(Exhibit 9).

Castle revised his Earnest iloney Receipt <:ind subr:iitted it:
Mrs. Olsen.

At this til1'e,

the Castle offer 1-1as to

inclu~e

all of the property that had forr;1erly been subject to the
Walters offer, but including an additional
north.

(See Exhibit 2).

Mr.

acquired an agreer.ient from Mr.

10 feet to the

Ciistle, at this tin1e, had
1~.;l

ters to ou.i ld

on the property purchased for hihl (Walters).
testified she would not have dealt with

11r,

;:i

slruct" 1

Mrs. Olsen
<..:astl~'

on lr

property had she thought that Bowen claimed any further
interest in the property.

She was further of the opinior.

that Mr. Gardner was completely informed of the Castle
transaction and Castle testif il1d that Gar::h er was comp le:;_
informed of his transaction with Mrs. Olsen.

9.

April 9, 1976.

Purchase -

Walters,

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer tc

(Exhibit 10).

On this date

\~alters

negotiated with t\rs. Olsen to buy the property immediate)\
North of that which is being purchased by Castle.

( Exhi~1:

2).
The testimony is in dispute as to whether the $4,SC'·
which was paid on 1\arch 29, 1976,

by lir.

\·!alters wos tile::

apply on the property purchased under Cxh i bit 10, or whe::
it was to continue the optioP on the llece1:iL

r l CJ,
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l '-J7'',

earnest money agreement.

Mr. Bamgartner, who handled the

matter for rlrs. Olsen, categorically stated that the $4,500.00
was to be applied with the $500.00 theretofore paid on the
oeceDber 19th contract as the down payment for the purchase
of the property covered by Exhibit 10.

llr. Walters contends

that it was consideration for extending his right to purchase
under the December 19, Earnest Money Offer, Exhibit 4.

The

question is moot, however, since there is no dispute between
Walters and Mrs. Olsen and Walters apparently was content to
have the entire $5,000.00 appJy to the earnest floney Agreement, Exhibit 10, which, in fact, has now been converted
into a deed secured by a Deed of Trust.
10.

April 20, 1976.

At this time, the Bowen contract

was closed and Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bamgartner prepared the
Warranty Deed, Exhibit 11, the closing statement for seller,
Exhibit 12, the closing statement for buyer, Exhibit 13, and
a letter agreement dated April 20, 1976, Exhibit 14.

The

letter agreement pertained to Bowen's responsibility for
paying for improvement to his property connected with the
construction of the street.

That agreement was written by

Mr. Gardner.
The transaction with Mr. Bowen was closed at Zions
First National Bank (R. 112).

Those present at the time of

closing were Lee Bamgartner, rlrs. Olsen, 11rs. Olsen's son,
and Ron Gardner, the representative for !lr. Bowen.

Mr.

Bowen did not appear.

-9-
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~;othing

option,

was said at this ti1:1e concerning nr. Do1;er,'~

if in fact he intended to retain one.

12.

!lay 25, 1976.

attorney for tlr.

On this date lir. Jcril E3. i.ib/,

Bowen, wrote a deI'.land letter to firs. G;

which she received subsequent to that date.

(Exhibit));.

On !lay 28, 1976, Mr. \hlson acting on bchalr of ilr.
Bowen,
Olsen.

filed a Lis Pendins against thP property of Mrs.
(Exhibit 21).

Because of the letter of tlay 25,
that was filed,

r.ir. Custle r1£used

and the lis p2ndin:

to go for,1:.ncJ 1Hth t'1i·:

earnest money agreement dated May 9,

1976, 1-illich was then_

the process of closing.
tion commenced.
Mr. Bowen acknowledges that all of the transactions
concerning the acquisition and purchuse of the property i:.
question were handled on his behalf by Mr. r;ardncr, and a:
no time prior to the taking of the det:iosi tions in this ca',
did Mrs. Olsen ever !'1eet !lr. Bowen.

Mr.

BaI'.lgartner testi-

fied that all of his transactions on behalf of Mrs. Olsen,
in connection with the Bowen transaction were complet~
through Hr. Gardner.
There is also submitted as Exhibit 20, un Earn2st ::::
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, between Lawrence \\alters":
others, with i•ir.

David E. Castle.

This exhibit was offer,

to de~onstrate that Castle, as of February 13, 197G, had
resolved his right to ?Urch0se the

W~lters

contract

merely waiting authority fro1;i Garclner· on behalf of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2n

1

Gow('il

deal directly with Mrs. Olsen concerning the property which
was subject to the Walters Earnest Money Receipt of December
19, 1975.
It is defendant's contention that the

ter~s

of the

earnest money agreement of December 22, 1975, (Exhibit 6),
were merged into the deed and subsequent agreement between
Mrs. Olsen and Bowen.

Since the option was not preserved

beyond that time, it is null and void.

In the alternative,

defendant asserts that Bowen waived any rights in the option
by telling 11rs. Olsen,

through Gardner, that he was no

longer interested in the property and allowing her to nego-·
tiate with Mr. Castle and Mr. Walters.

In addition, it is

defendant's position that the option agreement was not
supported by consideration, and therefore, it is not an
enforceable contract.

Final~y,

the purported option agree-

ment is completely unintelligeable, and therefore, void for
vagueness.
POINT I
THE LANGUAGE OF THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT CLEARLY
ABROGATES ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE EARNEST
tlOllEY AGREEt·iENT NOT INCLUDED IN THE FINAL CONTRACT OR DEED.

The language of the Earnest Money Agreement is clear
that execution of the final contract abrogates the Earnest
tloney Receipt and Offer to Purchase.
Lines 39 through 41 of tne Earnest Money Agreement
contain the following language:

-11-
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It is understood and agr.::ed thilt the terns
written in this receipt constitute the
entire prel1~inary contrilct between the
purchaser and the seller, and that no verbal statement made by anyone relative to
this trans.:iction shall he construed to be
a part of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein.
It is further
agreed that execution of the final contract
shall abroq3.te this I~arnest !IOl'C\' ncc·:::i;:it
and Offer to Purchase:---(E,:1phasi~ add0d):
It is a well stated rule that "a deed c'xecuted subsequent to the making of an exccutory contYact for the sa\.
of land supercedes that contract not only -,s to provisions
made pursuant to the terns of the contrdci

liut a lc,o as

tr~

stipulations in the contract oi which the conveyance is r.0:
a performance,

if the l?.Jrties intc·ndeci Lo

.urT011der ther.,

but they are not superceded if the parties did not intend
surrender them." 77 Am.Jur.2d 449, Vendor and Purchaser,
Section 290.
The facts clearly indicate that Bowen never

inte~ed

·

Between December 22, 1975, the date

preserve the option.

of writing of the option, and May 25, 1976, there was nev::
any indication by Bowen that lw intended to f)reserve the
option.

To the contrary, Gardner, Bowen's agent, repeate~:

stated to t·'.rs. Olsen,

to /lrs. Bamgartner, and to Mr. Castle

that Bowen had no intention of exercising Lhe option.

1'•

addition, at the closing of the Bowen-Olsen transaction or
April 20, 1976, absolutely no mention was ;;iade of

prese~·,-.

the option in the deed ancl a9reeraent execui..ed at that
The transaction

Vl3S

ti:

closed with tlrs. Olser,, nrs. Olsen''

son, Mr. Gardner, and 1lr. Ela1n3artner:- pr:-escnt.

liothing"
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said at that til'le concerning flr. Bowen's option.

Prior to,

and at the time of closing, there was absolutely no evidence
of Bowen's intent to exercise the option.

The only evidence

of Bowen's intent is to preserve the option is the belated
letter from Bowen's attorney on May 25, 1976.
It was upon these factors that the Court based its
Finding that:
"The earnest money agreement drafted by
the plaintiff was a single integrated
agreement with consideration sufficient to
support all of the terms of the earnest
money agreement, including the option, and
that by the express terms of the earnest
money receipt and option to purchase, the
option contained therein was abrogated at
the time of the finaJ contract. ( R. 14,
paragraphs 8 and 9).
A case somewhat similar to the present is Kelsey v. Hansen,
18 lJtah2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966).

That was an action by a

plaintiff-vendor to compel a real estate agent-purchaser to
pay for certain extras (drapes and the like) pursuant to an
agreement in an executed earnest money agreement.

There was

a subsequent conveyance by warranty deed, and the plaintiff's
theory was that the deed was not decisive of the agent's
cojnmi ttr:ient to buy and pay for the extras.

The court held

that the deed was decisive and
"That a merger resulted, especially since
the Earnest Money Receipt also said that
' i t is further agreed that execution of
the final contract shall abrogate this
Earnest ~oney Receipt.'
We have difficulty in seeing why a warranty deed to
Hansen should not abrogate the preliminary, loosely drawn, and almost incoherent
Earnest i!oney Receipt, and thus r.ierge what
really anounted to signed notes of a contemplated future transaction.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In absence of proof to the contrary,

there i:3

C'r· _

il

sumption that the parties intended ull of the Lerrns of l
prior agree1.1ents to be merged into the deed.
212 Kan.

364,

510 P.2d 1125 (1973).

\·/ebb v. Gt

----~

~f

And the execution

deed to realty without any reservation in it, merges all
prior negotiations and agreements relating thereto.
Baker, 95 C.A.2d 877,

S:iit:,

214 P.2d 94.

In the present case, there is absolutely no r:iention

J'

all in the warranty deed between Mrs. Olsen and Bowen of

t:

option or a reservation in any 1nannC'r.

(Exi1il>it J ).

Appellant has failed to overcone the presumption
there 1-1as a r11C'rger and has failed to c,J1ow that

th:i~

there v:Js

not, in fact, an intention of the parties to abrogate the
option agreement.

As a result,

the judgr.ient of the trial

court in that regard should be affirmed.
POINT I I
BOlrnN, THROUGH HIS AGEt!T GARDI!ER, WAIVEO HIS RIGHT 1;
CLAIM THE OPTION AND IS ESTOPPED FRON DOING SO.
It is undisputed that every transaction involving
Bowen, whether it was with Olsen, Castle, or Walters, was
negotiated for Bowen by Gardner.

Bowen had no personal

contact, so far as the evidence discloses, with any of tl·:
parties privy to the property which is in dispute.

TherE

were many negotiations on many occasions between Gardnn
and Bamgartner, between Gardner and

~rs.

Olsen, beLwe2n

Gardner and Castle, all of which required representatil'"·'
discussions, assertions, and conclusions.

At no tine •' 1
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Gardner, by words or conduct, state or imply that there was
a limit to his authority to act on behalf of Bowen.
On the contrary, Gardner prepared every Earnest Money
Agree;nent submitted,

(Exhibits 5,

6, 8, and 14).

He further

participated in the preparation of Exhibits 11, 12 and 13,
all on behalf of Bowen and all outside of the presence of
Bowen.
None of the parties to this transaction ever met with
Bowen, but conducted their entire negotiations with Gardner.

At no time prior to trial did nowen attach

~ny

restric-

tions or limitations to the aulhority given to Gardner to
2ct on his behalf.

Finally, iind probably r.iost importantly,

it was Gardner who added, in his own handwriting, the option
language to Exhibit 6, after Bowen had signed the document.
Since Bowen's case is an attempt to enforce the option,
obviously he cannot quarrel with Gardner's authority to act
on his behalf with regard to the option.
An agent is deemed to have the authority inherent in
the nature of the transaction which he is performing on
behalf of his principal and for which his principal knows he
is performing.

3 Am.Jur.2d 472, Agency §71; Park v. Moorman

1-:fg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273
(1952).
A principal who authorizes the agent to perform general
duties, also authorizes the agent to perform all functions
necessarily

i~rlied

3 Am.Jur.2d 472,

by reason of the specific duties assigned.

Agency §71.
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The terr.is of Exhibit 6 were selected by 801ven, uctir,·
through his agent Gardner.

l'lhcn on !l.pril 20, 1976, llowor,

again acti!lg through his ilgent Garoner, did not 1nak"

Jw:

effort to preserve what hils been deem2d an ortion, tile
option provision was abrogated,

for it was not includeu

the final contract between the parties.

1,

7hc L.Jll<JlluJC of:

Earnest Money Agreement so.ys specifically: "It is further
agreed that execution of the final contract shill! abrogat'
this Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase".
Nowhere in Exhibits 11, 12,
servation of the option.

13,

and l ,l,

i~

thc1 c' a11y 01'-

If Gardner had i he au th or i ty ts

write the option in the first place, he c< rLcinJy hdcl the
authority to preserve that option.

His failure to speak

a~

preserve the option is certainly chargeable to Dowen.
This conclusion is consistent, and only consistent,
with the testimony of Olsen, Bamgartner and Castle that
Gardner had advised them that Bowen clained no interest
whatever in the Walters contract or the property that was
then contemplated to be purchased by \'lalters.

Gardner's

continued involvenent in the negotiations between Walters
and Castle and Olsen and Castle required him to give notic
to those parties that Bowen claimed an option i.1terest.

:·

is inconceivable that Castle and Bamgartner, both experk
real estate brokers, would deal with the property i tselL
had they thought Bowen continued to have an intcccst or
they not relied upon Mr. Gardner's assertion that Bowen
claimed no interest.

Mrs. Olsen's dealings with CJstl 1•

-16-
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only consistent with her assertion that Gardner had told her
prior to February 16, that Bowen had no further interest in
the Walters property.

She had specifically told Castle,

which is verified by Castle, that he would have to get a
release from Gardner.
The fact that Castle prepared an Earnest Money Agreement on February 17, 1976,

(Exhibit 7), to purchase from

!!rs. Olsen the Walter's property, is only consistent with
his conversation with Gardner of that date that the property
was available for purchase.
The Earnest Money Agreement of April 9,
between Castle and Mrs. Olsen,

(Exhibit 10),

is only consistent with

Castle's conference with Gardner at Castle's home, which
occurred on or about March 4, 1976.

Mr. Castle told Gardner

that he, himself, would be the owner of the property, that
he had no relationship with Mr~ Walters, except that he was
going to construct an improvenent upon the property and
lease it to Mr. Walters, but that he was not an agent of Mr.
Walters.

This conversation was sufficient to put Gardner on

guard and to require him to notify Castle or Mrs. Olsen that
Bowen had an interest in the property.
The only logical explanation of Gardner's conduct is
that he in fact, on February 17, told Castle, and had prior
to February 16, 1976, told rlrs. Olsen, that Bowen did not
claim any further interest in the Walters property.
This circumstance is further corrobrated by the fact
that !Ir. Gardner had not completed his representation of Mr.
-17-
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Bo\"/en, for he was still negotiating with the proµert·y as
late as flarch 11, 1976, when he negotiated [or the
additional 22 feet to the north of the Bowen property anc
April the 20th when he handled the closing of the transaction.
The only involvement of !·Ir. Bowen in this entire trar::
N~tional

Bank on

for the purpose of signing the borrowers

closi~

action, was his appearance at Zions First
April 20,

statement, Exhibit 14, and the letter agreeir,cnt dated Apri:
20, 1976.
One other powerful fact in corroboratior, of the testimony that Gardnc>r told llrs. Olsen :me' Cas tlc

'=hat Bo1;er.

claimed no option is that Mrs. Olsen by her subsequent
dealings would have left herself an unsold piece of
34.27 feet wide by 245.87 feet deep.
parcel on Exhibit 2).

proper~

(See cross-hatched

It is inconceivable t-hat 1lrs. Olser,

would have so acted.
There could be no case in which the broad, general ar..
implied authorities of the agent are more consistent witr.
his conduct than the instant case.

The trial court's fine:·

that "Ronald Gardner, acting for and as the agent of the
plaintiff, by his words, acts and conduct, cat'sed the defe'·
dant to believe that the plaintiff had waived, abandoneairelinquished his right to exercise the option", should~
affirmed.

(R. 13, paragraph 7).
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POINT III
IN THE EVENT THAT THE OPTION AGREEMENT CONTAINED IN THE
EARNEST llONEY RECEIPT OF DECE11BER 22, 1975,
GATED,

NOT ABRO-

IT \WOLD FAIL FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.

The appellant is faced with a dilemna.
~oney

\~AS

The Earnest

furnished by Bowen was tendered prior to the inclusion

of the option provision.

Mr. Bowen, at the time of tendering

$1,000.00 Earnest Honey, on December 22, 1975, did not include
the option provision.
of January 8, 1976.
oppellant argues,
for the option.

That was added later on the evening
If the contract is s0verable as the

then certainly, there is no consideration
If it is not Geverable,

then it fails

because it was abrogated by not being included in the final
deed of the sale.
The Court, in its Findings of Fact No. 8, stated as
follows:
"The earnest money agreement drafted by the
plaintiff was a single integrated agreement
with consideration sufficient to support all
of the terms of the earnest money agreement,
including the option".
(R. 14).
Appellant argues that although there was consideration
for the entire agreement, the option was a separate agreement that could stand alone.

If that is the case, then the

appellant condones the finding of consideration by the Court
but condemns the single integrated agreement finding.

The

appellant cannot have it both ways.
If he disputes the "single integrated agreement"
finning,

then he must necessarily convince the Court that

-19-
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there was consideration for th2 separute option agreener.t.
This, of course,

is impossible because the consideration fo:

the ear:-iest money agreement was proffered before the optio:.
agreement was added.

The earnest 1'.loney,

therefore, coulci

only be for the offer and could not be for the option.
ar0ument is further bolstered by the fact
when the closing took place, Bowen

')Ot

Thi,

that on l\pril 20,

full consideration

for the earnest money against the purchase price of the
property described as parcel "B" on Cxhibi t
remained as consideration for llle

"01Jt

1 and nothing

1on".

Ji

the option

were to remain as a viable contract, there nad to be consideration for it.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully argues that the trial court ~
correct in its analysis of the facts and the applicationot
the law, and the judgment should be aff irrnea.

DA?EO

this~

day of Ausust, 1977.

MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent~
Jeril B. \\ilson, Attorney for i\ppellanc,
l:'rovo, Utah

S4601,

this

JjJ!:_

84 Cast 100 South,

clay of 1\usu~.t,

1977.
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